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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a within-country analysis of the impact of corruption on 
economic growth using a panel of Italian regions from 1968 to 2011 through a 
robust measure of corruption. This measure is averaged over 5-year periods to 
reduce short-run fluctuations and to reduce probable delayed effects, which are 
typical for latent phenomena such as corruption. The results show a significant 
negative impact of corruption on long-term growth in all specifications, both on 
average and for each Italian region. As a consequence, a zero-level of corruption is 
growth maximizing. This effect is non-linear such that the negative impact of 
corruption on growth becomes less intense as corruption increases. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a very latent phenomenon. Both the theoretical understanding and 
empirical evidence show that the effects of corruption can be multidimensional, 
persistent and uncertain. 1  This paper attempts to contribute to the already 
established - although contrasting - empirical literature on the impact of corruption 
on economic growth. A large number of the previously published empirical 
investigations on this topic focused on cross-country data. These investigations use 
perception indices as proxies for corruption and attempt to control for the diverse 
array of institutional variables that helps explain the differences in economic growth 
rates. We deviate from these analyses by using an ‘objective’ proxy for corruption, 
i.e., the number of reported crimes of corruption. In addition, we adopt a within-
country empirical approach, in which the institutional factors that influence 
economic growth do not severely undermine the causal investigation between 
corruption and growth. 
Within-country empirical investigations appear more reliable than cross-country 
investigations because differences among countries in terms of criminal laws, 
investigative departments, administrative controls, subsidies, transfers, and publicly 
owned enterprises may explain most of the variability in corruption. The case of 
Italy is particularly suitable for this type of investigation. First, there are large 
differences in income levels and growth rates across regions. The Southern regions 
have always lagged behind the regions in the Centre-North of the country, and this 
difference has become more severe in recent years. Second, an objective or direct 
measure of corruption is available, i.e., the number of crimes reported to the 
prosecution departments that were actually prosecuted. Third, no significant 
differences in the institutional systems can be detected among the 20 Italian regions. 
This plays in favour of a better specification in our empirical strategy. 
This study expands upon the scanty literature concerning within-country 
investigations of the impact of corruption on economic growth.2 First, we make use 
of a panel data set with a longer time interval (i.e., 1968-2011) than any other 
similar study. This allows for capturing the long-term dynamics of the causal 
relationship that could not otherwise be recognized using shorter time intervals. In 
particular, economic growth models require long time-series, a fortiori as the 
variable of interest, such as corruption, reverberates its effects over several years. In 
addition, it is worth noting that the anti-corruption laws were not changed in any 
significant way that would affect the behaviour of agents over this time span. 
Second, we use an original specification strategy to address the estimation issues of                                                              
1 Andvig (1991), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Bowles (2000), Jain (2001), Tanzi (2002), and Aidt 
(2003) provide detailed surveys on the economics of corruption. 
2 Previous empirical analyses on cross-regional data were conducted by Glaeser and Saks 
(2006) in the US, Cole et al. (2009), Dong (2011), Dong and Torgler (2013) in China, Del Monte 
and Papagni (2001) in Italy. 
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a latent and long-run phenomenon such as corruption, and to evaluate the sensitivity 
of the results. In particular, we compare the results by performing three different 
estimators: the pooled OLS estimator, the static (fixed effects) estimator, and the 
dynamic (GMM Arellano-Bond) estimator. This last estimator has been used in the 
context of annual observations in similar studies; whereas, in an original fashion, 
we apply this estimator to 5-year averages in order to better separate the long-run 
from the short-run relationship. Third, we test for the potential non-linear effects of 
corruption on growth. This issue has been extensively debated in the literature of 
cross-country studies, but found poor attention in within-country analyses. On the 
contrary, given the heterogeneity in corruption levels across regions and the rather 
centralized governmental system, Italy is a unique case study to test for non-linear 
relationships. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the relevant studies on 
the effects of corruption on economic growth. The third section presents the proxy 
for corruption and the descriptive statistics of the other variables. The fourth section 
includes the econometric framework and empirical results. The fifth section 
discusses the results. The final section concludes the study. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, we present a literature survey on the impact of corruption on growth 
without presuming to be exhaustive with respect to the extensive research 
performed in this field that still interests many scholars. Although the nexus 
between corruption and economic growth has been widely analysed, there is still 
contrasting evidence both in the causal relationship and in the sign and magnitude 
of the impact between the two variables. The difficulty in disentangling this thorny 
issue has been remarkably described by Paldman (2002), who emphasized the 
seesaw dynamics in which corruption and economic growth appear to feed on each 
other without a clear cause-effect relationship. This mainly empirical dilemma has 
been commonly handled using various econometric approaches, which strive to 
cope with the endogeneity problem. We explain the way we address this problem in 
the empirical section and focus on the impact of corruption on economic growth, 
which has substantial research behind it. Therefore, we skip the analysis of the 
determinants of corruption and economic development. 
In this perspective, the main research question is whether corruption is sand or 
grease in the wheels of economic development, which is a rather controversial and 
mainly empirical question, which has no definitive answer. As a matter of fact, 
crimes, such as corruption, albeit sanctioned by the law, may in principle help 
transactions to be smoother and faster, whereas bureaucracy is observed as sand in 
the mechanisms of exchange and production. In the past, the “grease” argument has 
been endorsed by several scholars using however theoretical or qualitative 
investigations, such as Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Myrdal (1968), and Leys 
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(1970). They explained that inefficient bureaucracy hampers economic growth, and 
corrupt practices, by operating as grease in the wheels, reduce friction. According to 
this viewpoint, corruption would eventually promote economic growth, especially 
in the early stages of economic development. In more detail, Rose-Ackerman 
(1978) and Lui (1985) found that corrupt practices minimize the waiting costs for 
those who placed more value to time.3 Similarly, Beck and Maher (1986) and Lien 
(1986) showed that the most efficient firms can afford the largest bribes, thereby 
minimizing their red-tape costs. In the history of Europe and the US, Bardhan 
(1997) showed that corruption favours development. More recently, Dreher and 
Gassebner (2013) provided evidence that corrupt practices could facilitate firms’ 
entry into highly regulated economies. This evidence characterizes corruption as a 
second-best solution vis-à-vis the inefficient bureaucracy that constitutes an 
impediment to investments. 
The “sand” argument appears to be supported by more substantial empirical 
evidence. According to this view, corruption acts as an uncertainty and cost-
increasing factor. This argument was pioneered by Mauro (1995), who performed a 
very detailed cross-country analysis, assessing the impact of corruption on 
economic growth and finding a significant negative causal relationship. His findings 
were confirmed by Mo (2001) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), among many 
others. However, it appears important to understand the channels through which 
corruption has an impact on economic growth.  
The private investment channel is one of the most widely investigated because 
public officials focus on rent-seeking activities in their often discretionary supply of 
public services, which would eventually induce a misallocation of resources in 
financial and human capital.4 More specifically, corruption undermines investments 
in education, inducing either the recruitment of unsuitable human resources (Mauro 
1995, 1997; Mo 2001; Gupta et al. 2002) or the adoption of rent-seeking activities 
rather than production activities (Baumol 1990; Murphy et al. 1991; Lui 1996; 
Lambsdorff 1998). Murphy et al. (1993) found that corruption discourages 
investments in innovation because ruling oligarchies favour established firms in 
exchange for bribes, raising barriers to entry for potential innovators. Wei (2000), 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Lambsdorff (2003), and Egger and Winner (2005) 
focused on FDI and found evidence that corruption acts as a tax and, consequently, 
reduces country attractiveness.  
Public investments are also an important channel through which corruption operates 
and affects economic growth. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Mauro (1997, 1998)                                                              
3  However, Kaufmann and Wei (2000) confute this argument and empirically show that 
companies paying more bribes are those which lose more time on paperwork as a result of 
negotiation with public officials. 
4 For general analyses on this topic see, among many, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bardhan 
(1997), and Ehrlich and Lui (1999). 
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provided evidence that politicians tend to divert public resources toward activities 
that are more vulnerable to corruption through distortive interventions in public 
procurements, which is the case for instance of high-cost and large-scale 
construction projects rather than high-return-value or small-scale decentralized 
projects. As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), corrupt officials distort public 
investment projects, awarding the producers who offer the largest bribes instead of 
the deserving producers. 
Bureaucracy is in a way the raison d’être of corruption and can be placed at the 
bottom of all other channels. Corruption induces bureaucrats to expand regulatory 
practices and slow down bureaucratic processes to persuade governmental clients to 
pay bribes (Myrdal 1968; Rose-Ackerman 1978). Kurer (1993) argued that corrupt 
officials have two distortive incentives: 1) to ration the provision of a public service 
to decide to whom to allocate that service in exchange for a bribe; 2) to limit the 
access of competent officials to key positions to preserve their rent from corruption. 
In this perspective, Méon and Sekkat (2005) provided cross-country evidence that a 
poor quality of governance makes corruption a depressing factor for economic 
growth.  
In contrast to various theoretical analyses and wide empirical cross-country 
evidence supporting the “sand” argument, Assiotis (2012) recently found that, after 
country-specific fixed effects are taken into account, no significant causal 
relationship between corruption and income exists.  
However, the debate is far from over. The “grease” and “sand” arguments may not 
necessarily contradict each other. Méndez and Sepulveda (2006) showed that low 
levels of corruption positively affect economic growth, while high levels are 
detrimental, although this non-linearity argument is valid only for democratic 
countries. Similarly, Aidt et al. (2008) found that in countries with high quality 
institutions, corruption has a large, negative impact on growth; however, in 
countries with low quality institutions, corruption has no impact on growth. 
Although rejecting the grease argument, Méon and Sekkat (2005) suggested a 
quadratic relationship between corruption and growth that depends on the degree of 
political freedom: a weak rule of law, an inefficient government and political 
violence tend to worsen the negative impact of corruption on growth. 
Therefore, the empirical analyses provided here explored the causal relationship 
under scrutiny using only cross-country investigations. However, the empirical 
analyses can be performed in another way: a within-country investigation, which is 
adopted in our study. As mentioned in the introduction, within-country 
investigations have the advantage of reducing or even eliminating the institutional 
differences existing across countries, thereby moderating the omitted variable bias, 
resulting in a beneficial effect on our estimates. Additionally, within-country 
investigations do not need to make the controversial and implicit assumption of 
cross-country investigations, i.e., that corruption and economic growth levels of 
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each country are in a steady state. Unfortunately, there are few within-country 
studies. 
Within-country data on corruption have been used by Goel and Nelson (1998) to 
relate corruption and government size, by Fisman and Gatti (2002) to understand 
corruption and decentralization, by Svensson (2003) to examine bribery and firms, 
and by McMillan and Zoido (2004) to study bribery and politicians. However, these 
studies did not focus on corruption and development. Glaeser and Saks (2006) 
performed a cross-regional analysis for the 50 States in the U.S. They actually 
scrutinized the impact of corruption on economic development but found weakly 
significant negative values. China provides another important example. Both the 
centralized legal and administrative systems and the wide variability in economic 
conditions allow for a robust cross-regional analysis. Dong (2011) provided 
evidence for both the “sand” and “grease” arguments, and consequently, the causal 
relationship does not appear robust. In a more recent study, Dong and Torgler 
(2013) identified a positive relationship between corruption and economic 
development in China, which is mainly driven by the transition to a market 
economy. In China, Cole et al. (2009) found that the regions that exert greater anti-
corruption efforts are also able to attract more FDI. However, the latter result was 
refuted by Dong (2011), who found identification problems and inappropriate 
measures of anti-corruption efforts. Finally, Del Monte and Papagni (2001) 
performed a cross-regional investigation in Italy using an old dataset (i.e., 1963-
1991). They focused on the effects of corruption, specifically arising from 
purchases made by government officials, on the efficiency of public expenditure. 
They found that the most corrupt Italian regions suffer from inefficient public 
spending, particularly investment in infrastructure, which results in lower growth 
rates.   3. A MEASURE OF CORRUPTION 
As previously stated, measuring corruption is complex, and no complete 
understanding has been achieved to date. Different proxies are used depending on 
the dimension of interest, i.e., a country or regional level. Perception indices are 
often considered the only consistent measure in the absence of more direct or 
objective proxies, which is typically the case in cross-country surveys. However, 
perception indices may heavily depend on the momentary public opinion and the 
media coverage of specific criminal cases. When we consider within-country data, 
more objective measures of corruption can be used.5  
In our investigation, we consider the number of crimes reported to prosecution 
departments for which prosecution has started as a proxy for corruption. This proxy 
includes all corruption-related crimes reported by region over the period from 1968                                                              
5 For the pros and cons of objective vs. subjective measurements of corruption see Jahedi and 
Méndez (2014). 
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to 2011.6 It differs from the indicators adopted by other cross-regional analyses. 
Glaeser and Saks (2006) used the number of public officials convicted for corrupt 
practices by the federal justice department in the U.S.. In China, similar to our 
measurement, Dong (2011) and Dong and Torgler (2013) derived corruption data 
from the number of annual registered cases on corruption in procurator’s office by 
region. In Italy, Del Monte and Papagni (2001) used an indistinct proxy of 
corruption that they define as the official number of crimes against the public 
administration divided by the total number of employees. 
Our proxy for corruption is not exempt from criticisms. It can be considered a 
measurement of crime detection, which is due to the effort of prosecution 
departments to investigate and impose criminal charges on new cases of corruption. 
As a consequence, it may underestimate the underlying phenomenon, but in a 
dynamic cross-regional analysis, this shortcoming is barely relevant. Another 
related criticism refers to the fact that the number of detected crimes by region may 
be affected by the different quality of the prosecution agencies across the country 
rather than the actual level of corruption (Treisman, 2007). However, in our case, 
there is no evidence that Italian prosecution agencies differ in terms of anti-
corruption efforts among regions, which is mainly due to two factors: 1) a 
centralized judiciary at a national level, including both judges and prosecutors, and 
2) prosecutors only comply with the law and are not accountable to political power. 
Furthermore, underreporting or reduced investigations could occur or become more 
severe as the amount of corruption increases. This behaviour could be due to the 
lack of trust towards the judiciary or the time constraints facing the investigation 
and prosecution departments that become more binding as corruption increases. 
However, this conjecture may not be supported when we take into account the 
spillover effects of the investigative and prosecution activity in crime reporting and 
discovery. These effects actually act in the opposite direction, reducing the 
difference between the measured and the actual corruption. As a consequence, this 
issue still remains debatable. 
We provide evidence of the robustness of this proxy. We compare our “objective” 
measure with a regional perception index of corruption that is available for only two 
years (2010 and 2013).7 Charron et al. (2013, 2014a, 2014b) provided these two 
measurements for most European regions and, consequently, also for the 20 Italian 
regions. The correlation results are encouraging as indicated in the scatterplot 
shown in Figure 1. The correlation between our proxy in 2009 and the perception                                                              
6 The source is the Annals of Criminal Statistics, National Institute of Statistics (Istat), various 
years, statutes no. 286 through 294. More recent data have not yet been published and have been 
provided by Istat. 
7  The perception index is equal to the average of five scores regarding the corruption 
perception in the education system, health care system, law enforcement, public services, and if 
the respondents were forced to pay bribes to obtain health care.   
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index in 2010 is equal to 0.70 and the correlation between our proxy in 2011 and 
the perception index in 2013 is equal to 0.53.8 
Figure 1. Scatterplot of corruption crimes and regional perception index 
 
SOURCE: Charron et al. (2013, 2014a, 2014b) and the Italian Institute of Statistics (Istat). 
NOTES: the horizontal axis includes corruption crimes per capita (100,000) in 2009 and in 2011; the vertical 
axis includes the regional corruption perception index reporting years 2010 and 2013. The score of the 
regional corruption perception index was originally negative; it has been transformed to positive. 
Furthermore, we compare a time series of the worldwide governance indicator 
(WGI) for the control of corruption, which captures the perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain, with our proxy at a national level. 
We cannot perform a correlation analysis due to the limited number of observations, 
but Figure 2 clearly shows that the medium-long run tendencies of both 
measurements are very similar. 
Figure 2. WGI-control of corruption and corruption crimes 
 
SOURCE: The World Bank Group and the Italian Institute of Statistics (Istat).                                                              
8  The 2010 survey was carried out between 15 December 2009 and 1 February 2010; 
therefore, we considered the 2009 indicator more appropriate. The 2013 survey was conducted 
between February and April of the same year; the last available year for our indicator was 2011. 
The score of the regional corruption perception index was originally negative; it has been 
transformed to positive. 
8 
 
NOTES: Corruption crimes are per capita (100,000). Both measures are normalized to 100 in 1996. Data are at 
the national level. We used smooth connecting lines. The yearly data from the WGI Control of Corruption for 
1997, 1999, and 2001 were missing; therefore, we used averages of the adjacent years. In 2000, the corruption 
crimes per capita indicator suffered from severe underreporting, as discussed further below. 
In an investigation on the determinants of corruption in Italy, Del Monte and 
Papagni (2007) provided further evidence on the robustness of the same proxy. 
They compared it to the CPI score for Italy and to an index of regional judicial 
efficiency.9 The analyses showed that the proxy is correlated with the CPI score and 
is not significantly related to regional judicial efficiency. Therefore, all of the 
checks performed in this and in previous studies confirm the robustness of our 
proxy in capturing the complex phenomenon of corruption.  
Figure 3 illustrates the trends of corruption in Italy and in the macro-areas of North, 
Centre, and South. There are no substantial differences in the trends among the 
macro-areas: a steady increase until 1991 and, in 1992, the so-called “clean hands 
operation” changed the overall attitude toward corruption both within the society 
and in investigative and prosecution departments, which very likely generated a 
spike in the reported crimes, reaching a peak in 1994. The increased rates indicate 
that some important change had occurred: from 9.09% in 1990 to 15.95% in 1991, 
the increase rate of corruption crimes per capita rose from 26.97% in 1992 to 
67.39% in 1993 and declined to 26.03% in 1994, and finally, it became negative. 
We have no reason to believe that the amount of actual corruption severely 
increased as the number of crimes detected per capita between 1992 and 1994 
suggests; we at least believe that the actual corruption did not increase by that 
magnitude. It is likely that, after 1992, the clean hands operation reduced the 
underestimation of the phenomenon rather than causing an increase in the actual 
levels of corruption. Di Nicola (2003) confirms this hypothesis and adds that, 
starting from 1995 with the end of the clean hands operation, a reduction in the 
moral tension against corruption occurred with a resulting increase in the amount of 
unobserved corruption. However, we cannot exclude the fact that, starting from 
1992, a long-term structural change also occurred.10 In particular, after this period, 
there is a divergence in the corruption levels between the sluggish economic area of 
the South and the more economically advanced regions of the North. After 1992, 
the Southern regions had increasing levels of corruption compared with the North, 
which seems related to the slightly increasing trend experienced before the nineties. 
                                                             
9 CPI is the Transparency International’s annual index of perceived corruption. 
10 During the period under scrutiny, the laws on corruption did not undergo any important 
changes besides the introduction of a new criminal procedure code at the end of 1989 and an 
increase in the penalties for corruption-related crimes in 1990. 
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 Figure 3. Reported crimes of corruption - 1968-2011 
 
SOURCE: The Italian Institute of Statistics (Istat). 
NOTES: Corruption crimes are per capita (100,000). The spike in 1978 in the Centre is due to an anomaly 
existing in Rome during that year of which we have no accounts. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows an apparently negative correlation between the average 
number of corruption crimes per capita and the average real GDP growth rate per 
capita. The heterogeneity in the corruption crimes per capita and in the economic 
growth rates across the Italian regions makes empirical analysis plausible as well as 
feasible.  
Figure 4. Scatterplot of corruption crimes and growth rates (1968-2011) 
 
SOURCE: The Italian Institute of Statistics (Istat) and Crenos. 
NOTES: Corruption crimes are per capita (100,000). Note that the Aosta Valley and Molise are the smallest 
regions of Italy. 
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 4.1 DATASET AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we test the hypothesis that corruption affects economic growth. We 
make use of a panel data set consisting of the Italian regions over the period from 
1968 to 2011. Following other studies on this subject, we consider 5-year averages 
of the variables of interest.11 Multi-year averages allow us to reduce the short-run 
fluctuations and alleviate concerns about endogeneity. Furthermore, for this type of 
crime, registered cases of corruption in one year could reflect crimes committed in 
previous years but detected in that year. Averaging reduces this lag effect. 
The dependent variable is the growth of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita, while the independent variable of interest is the number of detected 
corruption crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. We control for other long-run 
determinants of economic growth, such as physical and human capital growth per 
capita, population growth and the initial real GDP per capita. As an alternative 
estimate of the physical capital growth, we consider the private investment-GDP 
ratio. Human capital is proxied by the number of years of education per employee, 
while physical capital is obtained using the procedure described by, for example, 
Caselli (2005).12  
Table 1 shows the sources and summary statistics of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variables Source Mean St. dev. Min Max Obs. 
Corruption per 100,000 inh. Istat 2.809 2.565 0.0 26.5 880 
GDP per capita Crenos + Istat 18.854 6.593 7.0 33.5 880 
GDP growth per capita  Crenos + Istat 0.018 0.029 -0.1 0.1 860 
Private Investments/GDP Crenos + Istat 0.230 0.054 0.1 0.5 880 
Physical capital growth Crenos + Istat 0.022 0.017 -0.0 0.1 860 
Human capital Istat 9.129 1.732 6.0 13.8 840 
Human capital growth Istat 0.014 0.028 -0.2 0.2 820 
Public expenditure/GDP Crenos + Istat 0.210 0.049 0.1 0.3 880 
NOTES: Annual values. All monetary variables are expressed in real terms (constant euros of 2005). GDP per 
capita is expressed in thousands of euros. The variables reporting Crenos + Istat as a source were provided by 
CRENoS (1999) for the earlier years (i.e., 1968-1994), where we use the dataset Regio IT 60-96. In 
subsequent years (i.e., 1995-2011), we use the regional accounts data provided by ISTAT. As a proxy for 
human capital, we use the average number of years of schooling per employee. Human capital data until 2004 
are elaborated by Tornatore et al. (2004) from Istat data, whereas most recent years are directly obtained by 
Istat.                                                                
11 See, for instance, Méndez and Sepulveda (1996), Deininger and Squire (1996), Li et al. 
(2000), and Paldam (2002). 
12 Starting from the hypothesis that regions are at the steady state, the initial stock of capital 
K0 is 𝐼0/(𝑔 + 𝑑), where g is the geometric mean of the investment growth over a specific time 
interval, and d represents the capital depreciation rate (set to 6%). The capital stock in the 
subsequent years is 𝐾𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡−1 +  𝐼𝑡 − 𝑑𝐾𝑡−1. 
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In the following analysis, we will present different estimation strategies that attempt 
to address several econometric problems that such an analysis can encounter. We 
used three different estimators, i.e., the pooled cross-section OLS (POLS) estimator, 
the fixed effects (FE) estimator, and the generalized method of moments Arellano-
Bond (GMM A-B) estimator. 
Pooled OLS model 
As a baseline model, we consider the pooled OLS with cluster-robust standard 
errors. This model relies on the assumption that the intercepts are the same for all 
regions or that the errors are uncorrelated with the regressors. The inference needs 
to control for the likely correlation between the error term over time for a given 
region (within correlation) and a possible correlation between regions (between 
correlation). To address the within correlation problem, we rely on cluster-robust 
standard errors to check the statistical significance of the parameters. However, the 
POLS estimator may be inconsistent for at least a couple of reasons. First, it is 
possible that the relationship between the two variables under investigation is 
driven by a third omitted variable, which is correlated with both of them. For 
instance, this behaviour could be due to a different cultural disposition towards 
morality across Italian regions. Second, economic growth may affect corruption, 
rather than just being the effect. For instance, fast-growing regions may present a 
less friendly environment for corrupt practices. 
Static panel data model 
An alternative approach consists of using the fixed effects estimator with a static 
panel data model to control for endogeneity due to unobserved regional 
characteristics that the POLS estimator cannot successfully address. However, the 
FE approach does not solve the possible endogeneity due to the reverse impact of 
economic growth on corruption; it also does not allow for control of the 
endogeneity due to time-variant factors (Méndez and Sepulveda 2006).   
Dynamic panel data model 
Finally, to account for the weaknesses of the previous estimators, we consider the 
following Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model: 
?̇?𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑖?̇?𝑖,𝑡−5𝑖𝑄𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑖  𝑋𝑖,𝑡−5𝑖𝐽𝑖=0 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (1) 
where ?̇?  is the 5-year average growth of the real GDP per capita, 𝛼𝑖  is a time 
invariant region specific component, 𝜌𝑖𝑖  is the parameter of the autoregressive 
component of order q for region i, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−5𝑖  contains 5-year averages of the 
explanatory variables, including the corruption indicator. The presence of lags of 
the dependent variable (?̇?𝑖,𝑡−5𝑖) on the right-hand side is required because ?̇? follows 
an AR(Q) process.  
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Estimating such a model using the within estimator would give inconsistent 
results because the lags of the dependent variable are correlated with the error 
component. In the context of dynamic panel models, we can rely on a first-
differenced (FD) specification. However, the lagged dependent variables in the FD 
model have to be treated with IV estimators that use appropriate lags of ?̇?𝑖,𝑡  as 
instruments to lead to consistent parameter estimates. The endogenous components 
of the matrix 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑖  can be instrumented with their corresponding lagged terms 
(Anderson and Hsiao 1981; Holtz-Eakin 1988; Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell 
and Bond 1998). Moreover, we treat all variables in the matrix X as endogenous. 
This specification allows us to account for the possible existence of a reverse 
causality nexus between economic growth and corruption - or any other variable in 
X - to correctly identify only the effect of the latter on the former. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first time in the corruption literature that the GMM Arellano-
Bond estimator has been applied using variables that were averaged over 5-year 
periods.  4.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
To expand the number of observations, we use up to seven 5-year averages for each 
of the 20 Italian regions. To calculate non-overlapping 5-year averages, we initially 
consider the following seven time intervals: 1970-1975, 1976-1981, 1982-1987, 
1988-1993, 1994-1999, 2000-2005, 2006-2011.13 At a later stage, we will discuss 
whether the results are sensitive to shifting intervals.  
Table 2 reports the main results obtained using the POLS estimator with cluster-
robust standard errors.14 In all specifications, the dependent variable is the growth 
of the real GDP per capita. Growth of physical and human capital stock per capita 
(physical and human, hereafter), population growth (pop) and log of real GDP per 
capita of the first year within each interval (ingdp) are all regressors of specification 
I and are, constantly, included in all specifications except for specification IV in 
which physical is replaced by the investment-GDP ratio (inv). In addition to these 
variables, specifications II-V include the number of detected corruption crimes per 
100,000 inhabitants (corr), and specifications III-V include corr squared (corr2) to 
check for non-linearities. Specifications V and VI add the public expenditure-GDP 
ratio (pexp) to the set of independent variables of specification III. Specification VI 
replaces corr and corr2 with the log of corr (lcorr) and adds the interaction term 
(pexp*lcorr) between pexp and lcorr. All variables are averaged over 5-year periods 
except for ingdp.                                                               
13 Each interval consists of six years. To calculate the 5-year average of the growth rates, we 
need to consider one additional year for the variables expressed in levels. 
14 Similar results are obtained when using another robust estimator available in STATA 11 
(rreg) to deal with the presence of possible outliers in either the space of regressors or the space 
of residuals (Li 1985; Hamilton 1991). 
13 
 
Table 2. Pooled OLS estimates 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Corruption per capita (corr)  -.00222*** (0.001) 
-.00469*** 
(0.001) 
-.00682*** 
(0.001) 
-.0043*** 
(0.001)  
Corruption per capita 
squared (corr2)   
.000248*** 
(0.0001) 
.000377*** 
(0.0001) 
.000194** 
(0.0001)  
Log Corruption per capita 
(lcorr)      
-.0134*** 
(0.004) 
Population growth (pop) -.935*** (0.177) 
-1.3*** 
(0.181) 
-1.33*** 
(0.175) 
-1.38*** 
(0.219) 
-1.18*** 
(0.169) 
-1.11*** 
(0.145) 
Human capital growth per 
capita (human) 
.827*** 
(0.158) 
.731*** 
(0.137) 
.724*** 
(0.142) 
.841*** 
(0.154) 
.726*** 
(0.143) 
.743*** 
(0.157) 
Log real GDP per capita (t-
5) (ingdp) 
-.0627*** 
(0.024) 
-0.00382 
(0.024) 
0.0117 
(0.024) 
0.00938 
(0.028) 
0.000875 
(0.023) 
-0.0123 
(0.017) 
Physical capital growth per 
capita (physical) 
.438*** 
(0.069) 
.369*** 
(0.057) 
.327*** 
(0.056)  
.338*** 
(0.048) 
.312*** 
(0.044) 
Private Investment/GDP 
(inv)    
.0315* 
(0.017)   
Public Expenditure/GDP 
(pexp)     
.0399*** 
(0.008) 
-0.1 
(0.099) 
pexp*lcorr      
0.0252 
(0.019) 
N 140 140 140 140 140 140 
NOTES: The dependent variable is the growth of the real GDP per capita. All variables are averaged over 5-
year periods except for ingdp, which is the logarithm of the real GDP per capita of the first year within each 
interval. The figures in parenthesis are the cluster-robust standard errors. * denotes significance at a 10 
percent level, ** at a 5 percent level, and *** at a 1 percent level.  
We find that the coefficient of corr is statistically significant and negative with 
specifications II-V. In specification II, in which the variable enters linearly, the 
parameter value is -0.00222. In the non-linear specifications III-V, the coefficient of 
corr ranges between -0.0043 and -0.0068, whereas quadratic term corr2 is also 
significant but positive with a parameter value ranging between 0.00019 and 
0.00038. This evidence presents three issues: 1) The marginal effect of corruption is 
negative with respect to economic growth both on average and for each Italian 
region. As a consequence, a zero-level of corruption is growth-maximizing, which 
is in line with previous evidence for Italian regions (Del Monte and Papagni 2001) 
but differs with respect to some cross-country evidence that shows growth-
maximizing levels of corruption (e.g., Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006). 2) Due to the 
positive sign of the coefficient of corr2, the negative effect of corruption on growth 
becomes less intense as corruption increases. At some point, the detrimental effects 
of corruption are so high that additional levels of corruption may not be 
increasingly harmful. This evidence is compatible with a fixed cost of corruption 
that impairs the economic attractiveness of the region. 3) If we assume that the 
actual levels of corruption only change smoothly over time, the observed peak in 
our proxy may be – at least in part – due to a reduction in the underestimation of the 
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actual phenomenon. This may be responsible for the estimated nonlinearity at high 
levels of corruption because an increase in the observed corruption does not 
correspond to a similar increase in the actual levels and, therefore, does not have an 
impact on economic growth as the results seem to suggest. 
By comparing specifications I, II, and III, we note that the addition of corr and 
corr2 does not affect the coefficients of the other variables. We can also notice that 
the magnitude of the coefficient of corr increases when the squared term for 
corruption is included. The size of the coefficients allows us to conclude that the 
negative impact of corruption on economic growth appears larger when the 
specification includes a quadratic form. The coefficients of all control variables 
have the expected sign. The coefficient of the variable pop is always negative and 
statistically significant, while those of physical and human are always positive and 
significant. The coefficient of the term ingdp is negative but not significant at 
conventional levels. This result is not surprising because the Italian regions did not 
actually experienced convergence in recent decades. Thus, the results may also 
suggest that the lack of convergence in GDP per capita across Italian regions can be 
partially explained by the corruption levels impairing economic performance. The 
coefficient of private investments (inv) is positive and significant at a 10% 
significance level. In specification V, the coefficient of the public expenditure term 
(pexp) is significant and positive. Finally, specification VI shows that the 
coefficient of the interaction term (pexp*lcorr) is not significant, suggesting that 
public expenditure does not cause corruption to be more detrimental to economic 
growth, or likewise, it also suggests that corruption does not impair the likely 
growth-enhancing effect of public expenditure.  
Table 3 shows the results obtained from using the FE estimator on the same 
specifications (I-VI) introduced above. The coefficients of corr are very similar to 
those obtained with the POLS estimator. In the linear specification (II), the 
parameter value is -0.0027. In the non-linear specifications (III-V), the parameter 
value increases in absolute terms and ranges between -0.00516 and -0.0081. The 
coefficients of the squared corruption term (corr2) are also significant and positive 
with values ranging between 0.00024 and 0.00041. The coefficients for physical, 
human, pop, and ingdp are also very similar to those obtained from the POLS 
estimator. The coefficient of the variable inv becomes non-significant and that of 
pexp is only significant at the 10% confidence level, which is most likely due to the 
quasi-time-invariant nature of these variables. Finally, the coefficient of the 
interaction term (pexp*lcorr) is again non-significant. 
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Table 3. Fixed Effects Estimates 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Corruption per capita (corr)  
-.00274*** 
(0.001) 
-.00553*** 
(0.001) 
-.00807*** 
(0.001) 
-.00516*** 
(0.001)  
Corruption per capita 
squared (corr2)   
.000265** 
(0.0001) 
.000411*** 
(0.0001) 
.000239** 
(0.0001)  
Log Corruption per capita 
(lcorr)      
-.0149* 
(0.008) 
Population growth (pop) -1*** (0.239) 
-1.4*** 
(0.238) 
-1.51*** 
(0.207) 
-1.76*** 
(0.233) 
-1.46*** 
(0.215) 
-1.31*** 
(0.267) 
Human capital growth per 
capita (human) 
.833*** 
(0.163) 
.724*** 
(0.137) 
.706*** 
(0.134) 
.738*** 
(0.143) 
.703*** 
(0.135) 
.753*** 
(0.163) 
Log real GDP per capita (t-
5) (ingdp) 
-2.36 
(1.655) 
-0.351 
(0.947) 
-0.372 
(1.053) 
-0.186 
(1.726) 
0.79 
(1.376) 
-0.227 
(2.181) 
Physical capital growth per 
capita (physical) 
.587*** 
(0.062) 
.387*** 
(0.066) 
.315*** 
(0.064)  
.313*** 
(0.064) 
.352*** 
(0.086) 
Private Investment/GDP 
(inv)    
0.0227 
(0.022)   
Public Expenditure/GDP 
(pexp)     
.0923* 
(0.049) 
-0.111 
(0.27) 
pexp*lcorr      
0.0333 
(0.043) 
N 140 140 140 140 140 140 
NOTES: The dependent variable is the growth of the real GDP per capita. All variables are averaged over 5-
year periods except for ingdp, which is the logarithm of the real GDP per capita of the first year within each 
interval. The figures in parenthesis are the standard errors. * denotes significance at a 10 percent level, ** at a 
5 percent level, and *** at a 1 percent level.  
Finally, Table 4 reports results obtained by estimating specifications I-VI using the 
GMM A-B estimator.15 In this model, we include a lagged term for the dependent 
variable after we determined, using the A-R test, that one lagged term (gdp-5) is 
sufficient to avoid serial correlation of the errors. Moreover, we drop the variable 
ingdp because it is collinear with respect to the variables that are used by the GMM 
A-B method to instrument the lagged value of the dependent variable. Again, the 
corruption estimate appears significantly negatively correlated with economic 
growth. The parameter values of corr are very similar to those previously obtained 
using POLS and FE estimators, ranging between -0.0037 (in the linear 
specification) and -0.0068. The coefficients of pop and human also confirm the 
previous results. The coefficients of the variables inv and pexp are not significant as 
in the previous estimates, while the coefficient of physical becomes non-significant. 
Finally, in specification VI, the coefficient of the interaction term (pexp*lcorr) is 
weakly significant and positive. This result confirms the previous evidence against                                                              
15  Regressions, which rely on the one-step GMM Arellano-Bond estimator, were performed 
with the econometric software STATA 11. Serial correlation of errors is checked by means of the 
Arellano-Bond test. The Sargan test is used to check whether the overidentifying restrictions are 
valid. Standard errors are corrected following the suggestions by Windmeijer (2005). 
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the hypothesis that public expenditure amplifies the negative effect of corruption on 
growth. 
Table 4. GMM Arellano-Bond estimates 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Real GDP per capita (t-5) 
(gdp-5) 
0.147 
(0.1046) 
0.0966 
(0.116) 
0.0376 
(0.0912) 
0.0613 
(0.0849) 
0.0634 
(0.0857) 
0.0838 
(0.084) 
Corruption per capita (corr)  -.00372*** (0.001) 
-.00611*** 
(0.002) 
-.00681*** 
(0.001) 
-.00597*** 
(0.001)  
Corruption per capita 
squared (corr2)   
0.000225 
(0.0002) 
.000279* 
(0.0002) 
.000246** 
(0.0001)  
Log Corruption per capita 
(lcorr)      
-.0284*** 
(0.009) 
Population growth (pop) -.586** (0.242) 
-1.26*** 
(0.174) 
-1.4*** 
(0.155) 
-1.45*** 
(0.235) 
-1.42*** 
(0.155) 
-1.13*** 
(0.204) 
Human capital growth per 
capita (human) 
1.57*** 
(0.26) 
1.27*** 
(0.225) 
1.04*** 
(0.182) 
1.09*** 
(0.143) 
.99*** 
(0.154) 
1.11*** 
(0.219) 
Physical capital growth per 
capita (capital) 
.383** 
(0.158) 
0.0423 
(0.17) 
0.123 
(0.126)  
0.139 
(0.136) 
0.193 
(0.142) 
Private Investment/GDP 
(inv)    
0.0092 
(0.068)   
Public Expenditure/GDP 
(pexp)     
-0.0058 
(0.055) 
-.493* 
(0.27) 
pexp*lcorr      
.0882* 
(0.047) 
N 100 100 100 100 100 100 
NOTES: The dependent variable is the growth of the real GDP per capita. All variables are averaged over 5-
year periods. The figures in parenthesis are the standard errors. * denotes significance at a 10 percent level, ** 
at a 5 percent level, and *** at a 1 percent level.  4.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To check the consistency of these results, we consider different sets of time 
intervals with respect to the one proposed above. In particular, we consider 5-year 
non-overlapped and adjacent time intervals (as above) that are shifted back in time, 
such that the ending years for each set are 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. In the cases 
of the sets ending in 2007 and 2008, the time intervals are restricted to 6, whereas 
time intervals are 7 when the sets end in 2009 and 2010. We find that the parameter 
values of corr and corr2 are very stable across all considered groups of data. 
In the year 2000, the data collection suffered from problems of underreporting of 
tribunals and prosecution agencies caused by some changes encountered by the 
judiciary, which affected data for all criminal offences. Moreover, the observation 
from 1978 for the Lazio region is anomalously high. We expect that these problems 
do not significantly affect our estimates because we use 5-year averages. However, 
to determine whether these anomalies in the data recording had an effect on our 
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estimated coefficients, we replaced the suspected data with the averages of the data 
from the adjacent years. The results are very similar in both cases.  
Because the corruption data for the small regions Molise and the Aosta Valley are 
likely to be more imprecise, we treat them as outliers. Therefore, we eliminate them 
from the sample and re-run regressions for all specifications and estimators. The 
results are again similar to those previously reported.    
Finally, we wonder whether the legislative, social, and political shocks of the first 
half of the 1990s in Italy, such as the enactment of some changes in the criminal 
law of corruption in 1990 that stiffened penalties, the so-called clean-hands 
operation in 1992-1993, the bomb attacks on the anti-mafia judges Falcone and 
Borsellino in 1992, and the end of the “institutional” Christian democrats 
governments in Italy in 1992-1994, could have affected the estimates of corruption 
on economic growth. To verify this hypothesis, we consider two different datasets: 
in one dataset, we exclude the observations from the time interval 1994-1999, and 
in the other one, we exclude the time intervals 1988-1993 and 1994-1999. Then, we 
estimate the same specifications as before (I-VI) using all three estimators. We find 
confirming results.16 5. DISCUSSION 
To understand the intensity of the phenomenon under examination, we measured 
the average magnitude of the impact of corruption on economic growth according 
to the estimated parameters for corruption reported in the previous section. An 
increase of a standard deviation in the corruption levels results in a reduction in the 
growth of GDP per capita by between 0.78 and 1.49 percentage points, depending 
on the specification and estimator. To compare the Italian case with other two 
prominent cases such as U.S. and China, we also measure the impact in terms of 
standard deviations of growth of GDP per capita of a change in a standard deviation 
in the corruption levels. In particular, an increase of a standard deviation in the 
corruption levels in Italy results in a reduction between 25.6% and 51.3% of a 
standard deviation of growth of GDP per capita, depending on the specification and 
estimator. We collected regional data of the U.S. and China to elaborate the 
standard deviations of growth of GDP per capita. Glaeser and Saks (2006) for the 
U.S. and Dong (2011) for China provided the data for corruption and the estimates 
of the impact of corruption on economic growth. Our estimation upon these data 
reveals that an increase of a standard deviation in the corruption levels results in a 
reduction of 19% and 78% of a standard deviation of growth of GDP per capita in 
the U.S. and China, respectively. This comparison suggests that reducing corruption 
levels in developing economies such as China has higher growth-enhancing effects 
than other developed countries such as Italy and the U.S..                                                                 
16 All results of robustness checks can be provided upon request. 
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Regional heterogeneity in corruption can contribute to understand regional 
differentials in economic growth. For instance, Emilia Romagna is the Italian region 
with the smallest number of detected corruption crimes over the entire timespan. It 
has on average one-third of the corruption level of Calabria, one of the most corrupt 
regions in Italy. 17 In Table 5 we show, using a simple simulation, the average 
growth rate that a region would achieve if it had the same corruption level as Emilia 
Romagna. It emerges, for instance, that while Lombardy would grow by an 
additional 0.27 percentage points per year, Lazio and Calabria would increase by an 
additional 1.45 and 1.91 percentage points per year, respectively.  
Table 5. Simulations of the impact of corruption on yearly growth by region 
Region Corruption %GDP �%GDP (min) �%GDP (max) 
Emilia Romagna 1.5 2.08 0 0 
Marche 1.8 1.90 0.13 0.24 
Lombardy 1.9 1.72 0.14 0.27 
Veneto 2.0 1.96 0.21 0.39 
Piedmont 2.0 1.66 0.22 0.41 
Apulia 2.2 1.73 0.27 0.51 
Tuscany 2.2 1.68 0.27 0.51 
Trentino-South Tyrol 2.3 1.87 0.33 0.62 
Umbria 2.4 1.85 0.37 0.70 
Campania 2.6 1.47 0.44 0.83 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 2.7 2.24 0.49 0.91 
Basilicata 3.0 1.86 0.59 1.10 
Sardinia 3.1 1.51 0.64 1.18 
Sicily 3.2 1.54 0.68 1.26 
Abruzzo 3.4 2.17 0.73 1.35 
Liguria 3.4 1.77 0.73 1.36 
Lazio 3.5 1.68 0.78 1.45 
Aosta Valley 3.6 1.00 0.81 1.50 
Calabria 4.3 1.69 1.03 1.91 
Molise 5.1 2.12 1.29 2.37 
NOTES: The column Corruption reports the number of detected corruption crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. 
The column %GDP shows the average growth of the GDP per capita in the interval 1968-2011. The last two 
columns describe the yearly increase in percentage points of the GDP per capita if all of the regions had the 
same corruption level as the least corrupt region, which is Emilia Romagna. In particular, in these two 
columns we distinguish between the yearly minimum and maximum percentage increase of GDP per capita, 
depending on the overall effect of the estimated coefficients of corruption for all estimators and specifications, 
including the quadratic form. 
The regions that can profit from control of corruption are mostly in the Centre and 
South of Italy, e.g., Calabria, Lazio, Sicily, Sardinia, Campania, etc. These are also 
the regions that experienced the lowest growth rates over the entire timespan. Thus,                                                              
17 The Molise and Abruzzo regions in South Italy and the Aosta Valley and Friuli Venezia 
Giulia regions in North Italy are small regions and can be considered outliers. 
19 
 
a reduction in the differentials between the corruption levels could reduce the 
regional disparity in GDP per capita between South and North Italy.  6. CONCLUSIONS 
This empirical investigation aimed at expanding the understanding over the 
existence and size of the impact of corruption on economic growth at a regional 
level. Italy appeared as a privileged corner to perform this type of analysis for three 
main reasons: 1) the homogeneity of the law and enforcement system across 
regions; 2) the regional heterogeneity of the variables involved in the analysis; 3) 
the availability of a long panel data set. In particular, the long panel (i.e., 44 years) 
allowed us to address the latency characterizing corruption by means of a set of 
estimators applied to multi-year averages. This helped to separate the long-run 
tendencies from the short-run occurrences.  
We found evidence that the presence of corruption is detrimental to long-run 
growth. In addition, corruption enters the relation with economic growth in a non-
linear form. This evidence is robust and persistent throughout different models and 
specifications. Accordingly, we can draw a few considerations. The impact of 
corruption is always negative with respect to economic growth both on average and 
for each Italian region. The levels of corruption in the Italian regions lie along the 
negative slope of the relation between corruption and economic growth, which 
might be U-shaped. The zero-level of corruption is growth maximizing. Moreover, 
the value of the quadratic term of corruption is positive. Thus, the negative effect of 
corruption on growth becomes less intense as corruption increases. A possible 
interpretation could be that corruption entails a fixed cost and a variable cost in 
terms economic attractiveness of the region such that, as corruption increases, the 
fixed cost is watered down and, eventually, corruption may not be increasingly 
harmful. 
We do not find any evidence that public expenditure increases the detrimental 
effects of corruption on economic growth, or read differently, no evidence suggests 
that corruption makes public expenditure inefficient in its growth-enhancing effect. 
Instead, corruption itself may reduce the levels of public spending rather than its 
effectiveness. This can be mainly due to inefficient public servants, non-credible 
politicians, and the increasingly stricter requirements and procedures to capture 
public money when corruption levels are high. For example, consider the low 
percentages of EU structural funds spent by Southern Italian regions, where 
corruption is highly pervasive, with respect to those spent by other Italian regions.18  
                                                             
18 In the 2007-2013 structural funds agenda, the Southern Italian regions have been able to 
spend by April 2014 about 45% of the funds compared to 59% of the remaining Italian regions 
(source: Italian Department of Development and Social Cohesion). 
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Finally, the results also suggest that the corruption levels help explain the lack of 
convergence in GDP per capita across Italian regions in recent decades. The Central 
and Southern regions of Italy could achieve a significant increase in GDP per capita 
up to approximately 2 percentage points per year by reducing their corruption levels 
to the same level as the most virtuous Italian region. Hence, corruption appears a 
strong impediment to economic performance, and its reduction would unleash the 
economic energies of the most sluggish regions, thereby reducing the persistent gap 
between the two areas of the country. 
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